Person, Level, Voice : A Rhetorical Reconsideration by Walsh, Richard
T h e  O h i O  S T a T e  U n i v e r S i T y  P r e S S   /   C O l U m b U S
Postclassical Narratology
Approaches and Analyses
edITed by 
JaN alber aNd MoNika FluderNik
Copyright © 2010 by The Ohio State University.
All rights reserved
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Postclassical narratology : approaches and analyses / edited by Jan Alber and Monika 
Fludernik.
      p. cm. —  (Theory and interpretation of narrative)
 Includes bibliographical references and index.
 ISBN-13: 978-0-8142-5175-1 (pbk. : alk. paper)
 ISBN-10: 0-8142-5175-7 (pbk. : alk. paper)
 ISBN-13: 978-0-8142-1142-7 (cloth : alk. paper)
 ISBN-10: 0-8142-1142-9 (cloth : alk. paper)
 [etc.]
 1.  Narration (Rhetoric)  I. Alber, Jan, 1973– II. Fludernik, Monika. III. Series: Theory and 
interpretation of narrative series.
 PN212.P67 2010
 808—dc22
                                                           2010009305
This book is available in the following editions:
Cloth (ISBN 978-0-8142-1142-7)
Paper (ISBN 978-0-8142-5175-1)
CD-ROM (ISBN 978-0-8142-9241-9)
Cover design by Laurence J. Nozik
Type set in Adobe Sabon
Printed by [don’t know yet]
The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of the American 
National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library  
Materials. ANSI Z39.48-1992.
9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1
Acknowledgments vii
Introduction
Jan alber and monika Fludernik 1
Part i. 
extensions and reconfigurations of Classical Narratology
1 Person, Level, Voice: A Rhetorical Reconsideration
richard walsh 35
2 Mise en Cadre—A Neglected Counterpart to Mise en Abyme. 
 A Frame-Theoretical and Intermedial Complement to 
 Classical Narratology
werner wolF 58
3 Large Intermental Units in Middlemarch
alan Palmer 83
4 Mediacy, Mediation, and Focalization: The Squaring of
 Terminological Circles
monika Fludernik 105
Part ii. 
transdisciplinarities
5 Directions in Cognitive Narratology: Triangulating Stories, 
 Media, and the Mind
david herman 137
Contents
vi  Contents
6 Hypothetical Intentionalism: Cinematic Narration Reconsidered
Jan alber 163
7 Sapphic Dialogics: Historical Narratology and the Sexuality of Form
susan s. lanser 186
8 Narrators, Narratees, and Mimetic Desire
amit marcus 206
9 Narratology and the Social Sciences
Jarmila mildorF 234
10 Postclassical Narratology and the Theory of Autobiography
martin löschnigg 255
11 Natural Authors, Unnatural Narration
henrik skov nielsen 275
Contributors 303
Index 307
My purpose in this essay is to critique the concept of narrative voice from the 
vantage point of a rhetorical model of fictive representation. In its core sense, 
narrative voice is concerned with the narrating instance, the various manifes-
tations of which are usually categorized in terms of person and level. These 
distinctions provide for a typology of narrating instances which is conven-
tionally understood within a communicative model of narration—a model 
in which the narrating instance is situated within the structure of narrative 
representation, as a literal communicative act (that is, as a discursive event 
that forms part of a chain of narrative transmission). By adopting a rhetori-
cal approach to voice, I am proposing to invert the hierarchy of that rela-
tionship between structure and act. From a rhetorical standpoint, narrative 
representation is not conceived as a structure within which a communicative 
model of narrative acts is implied, but as an act itself, the performance of a 
real-world communicative gesture—which, in the case of fictional narrative, 
is offered as fictive rather than informative, and creates, rather than trans-
mits, all subordinate levels of narration. Such a perspective upon narrative 
representation exposes the fundamental incoherence of the standard commu-
nicative model, and establishes the need for some basic distinctions between 
different senses of voice in narrative theory.
 My argument, then, begins by demonstrating the incoherence of the rep-
resentational typology of narrative voice as embodied in the communicative 
model of the narrating instance. This demonstration focuses upon the ele-
mentary categories of person and level that articulate this typology; its claim 
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is that it is not possible to sustain the distinction between these two categories 
in representational terms, and their collision results in contradiction. I go on 
to show that a rhetorical model of instance, reverting to Plato’s distinction 
between diegesis and mimesis and the recursive principle it embodies, can 
accommodate the range of narrative possibilities more coherently and simply. 
By elaborating upon the principle of recursiveness in representation I dem-
onstrate the need for a distinction between narrative voice as instance and as 
idiom; closer attention to the function of voice in free indirect discourse and 
focalization establishes a further distinction between idiom and a third sense 
of voice I term interpellation; finally, a return to my overarching rhetorical 
frame of reference clarifies the distinction between this third sense and the 
sense of voice as instance with which I began.
 The key premises for the whole discussion, for which I have argued else-
where, are the conception of narrative representation as rhetorical in mode, 
and as semiotic (rather than narrowly linguistic) in scope.1 I comment further 
upon these issues in the discussion that follows, so here I will only indicate 
the forms in which they arise. The rhetorical orientation of my argument 
straightforwardly appropriates Plato’s emphasis upon the act of narrative 
representation as either diegesis or mimesis (the poet either speaking in his 
own voice, or imitating the voice of a character); I merely draw out the recur-
siveness implicit in that formulation, and discriminate between its legitimate 
scope as a model of agency and the rather different issue of rhetorical effect. 
The semiotic nature of narrative representation is asserted here in my insis-
tence upon the (generally acknowledged) metaphorical nature of the con-
cept of voice, and my efforts to take the full measure of that fact in respect 
of other narrative media (principally film, but also the cognitive medium of 
mental representation). These two premises share the common definitional 
assumption that stories, of whatever kind, do not merely appear, but are told.
 Stories do not emerge circumstantially out of phenomena: they exist as 
stories by virtue of being articulated (always admitting that this may be a 
private, internal act of representation as well as a public, social one). The 
immediate implication is that narration in its primary sense is never merely 
narrative transmission but narrative representation—that is, the semiotic use 
of its medium. Narrative transmission applies not to the telling of a story (as 
if it pre-existed as such), but to the merely reproductive mediation of a prior 
discourse. In fiction, transmission is an element of the rhetoric of represented 
telling—that is, representing an intra-fictional narrative discourse as if you 
were transmitting an extant discourse. Acts of narrative representation, in 
 1. See especially chapters 1 and 6 of The Rhetoric of Fictionality (Walsh 2007).
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other words, are themselves among the possible objects of narrative repre-
sentation: one of the things a story may be about is the telling of a story. The 
crucial point, however, is that this recursive possibility, however prominent 
in fiction, does not account for fictionality itself: the effect of narrative trans-
mission is a subordinate and contingent product of the rhetoric of narrative 
representation.
 The dominant narratological sense of voice, that which bears upon the 
narrating instance, is Gérard Genette’s. One of the main sources of confusion 
around the concept of voice is that Genette’s version of the metaphor does 
not draw upon the sense of voice as vocalization, but upon its grammati-
cal sense (active or passive voice): “‘the mode of action [ . . . ] of the verb 
considered for its relation to the subject’—the subject here being not only 
the person who carries out or submits to the action, but also the person (the 
same one or another) who reports it” (1980: 213). It is no less metaphorical 
for that—indeed, Genette acknowledges that his appropriation of linguistic 
terminology throughout Narrative Discourse shows most figurative strain 
at just this point (31–32). But the range of Genette’s metaphorical vehicle is 
quite distinct from that of the more general, or more intuitive, usage; a major 
consequence being that many of the concerns that fall naturally under voice 
for other theorists are addressed separately by Genette. So free indirect dis-
course, for many the key issue in discussions of voice, is treated under mood 
in Genette’s scheme. The chapter on mood is also where he presents the cru-
cial concept of focalization, which for theorists following Franz Karl Stanzel 
is inextricable from the broader notion of mediacy—that is to say voice in 
Genette’s own sense, as narrating instance. Given these terminological and 
taxonomical discrepancies, it is perhaps all the more striking that both theo-
rists explicitly privilege language as the paradigmatic, if not intrinsic, medium 
of narrative instanciation. Genette makes this axiomatic: he refers to media 
such as film and the comic strip as extranarrative, “if one defines narrative 
stricto sensu, as I do, as a verbal transmission” (1988: 16).
 I am suggesting instead that a narrating instance may be considered as 
any particular use of any medium for narrative purposes. Narration, on this 
view, is essentially a representational act, not just a verbal one. Voice in Gen-
ette’s sense, as instance, is a figure for agency in narration: I take that to be 
as inherently a part of film and drama as it is of the novel, and as crucial to 
understanding the rhetorical import of narratives in those media. Seen in this 
light the voice metaphor is in no way specific to language, and neither are the 
main concerns that Genette addresses under this heading: person and level. 
(Tense, Genette’s other concern under the heading of voice, is clearly spe-
cific to language unless taken more broadly as an index of the temporal rela-
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tion between represented narrations and the events they narrate; but see the 
following discussion of his comments upon the intrinsic “homodiegeticity” 
of present-tense narration.) Genette is himself quick to point out the strict 
irrelevance of the linguistic category of person in the traditional distinction 
between first- and third-person narration: the basis for his own distinction 
between homo- and heterodiegetic narration, as well as the distinction of 
level between extra- and intradiegetic narration, is the relation between the 
narration and the represented world of the story (I am leaving aside auto-
diegetic, which is just a subset of homodiegetic; and metadiegetic, which is 
just second-degree intradiegetic). I want to suggest, however, that even these 
distinctions, whilst undeniably useful, are not finally well founded in terms 
of their own theoretical premises.2 This points us towards a somewhat differ-
ent paradigm in which the salient fact is simply the recursive possibility that 
a narrating instance may represent another narrating instance; or in Plato’s 
terms, that narrative diegesis may give way to narrative mimesis.
 It is clear that any narration, whether first-person or third-person (as 
these terms are generally understood) may incorporate the event of another 
act of narration, at a second level. Conversely, any narration, at whatever 
level, may equally well be first-person narration or third-person narration. 
The categories of person and level appear to be clear and distinct; the clas-
sification of a narrative discourse in either respect is not determined by its 
classification in the other. Whence the possibility of such four-part typologies 
of narrators as Genette’s (Figure 1.1), in which the categories of level and 
person respectively define the horizontal and vertical axes (person, here, is 
“relationship,” since Genette rejects the traditional terminology). Genette’s 
more analytic terminology makes it clear that the category of person is not 
really about the choice of personal pronouns, but rather a matter of the status 
of the narrative act. The dominant issue for the “relationship” distinction 
seems to be an epistemological one: with what kind of authority does the nar-
rator speak? That of omniscient or impersonal detachment from the events 
related? Or that of an interested witness to those events? With regard to level, 
on the other hand, the dominant issue seems to be ontological: from which 
world does the narrator speak? Ours? Or the world of another narrative—the 
world of the Arabian Nights, or of the Odyssey? What Genette’s terminol-
 2. To clarify the scope and purpose of my argument here, it is worth noting that I do not 
want to suggest that Genette’s typology lacks analytical value, or to diminish its significance 
to narrative theory ever since the publication of Narrative Discourse. My claim is simply that 
it is logically incoherent, and therefore should not finally be taken as an account of the repre-
sentational logic of fictional narrative, but as a testament to the fictive rhetoric that produces 
and frames the appearance of such a logic.
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ogy also implies, however, is that the categories of person and level do share 
a common frame of reference, with respect to which all four of his terms are 
defined: that is, the notion of diégèse, or story world.
 Genette’s term diégèse does not relate to the Platonic term, diegesis, but to 
a distinction originating in film theory between the diegetic universe (domain 
of the signified) and the screen universe (domain of the signifier). So a diégèse 
is the universe of the events represented by a given narration. Despite this 
subordination of diégèse to narration, Genette’s classification of narrative 
levels assigns each narrating instance to the diegetic level that includes it, so 
that the first level of any narrative is necessarily extradiegetic.3 Well then, is 
the extradiegetic a diegetic level? Genette needs it to be such, because the 
primary narrating instance may be fictional, and so represented (as with Mar-
cel’s narration, or Pip’s, or Huck’s). At the same time he also needs it not to 
be diegetic, because the primary narrating instance is directly addressed, he 
says, to “you and me” (1980: 229).4 The equivocal status of the extradiegetic 
level serves to evade the infinite regress of diegetic levels that must result 
from the assumption, fundamental to the communicative model, that every 
narrating instance is literal with respect to the events represented—that it is 
ontologically continuous with the world on which it reports (this is simply a 
precondition for narrative transmission). Such an assumption dictates that 
if the events are fictional, the report is fictional, and therefore must itself be 
represented; but the representation of that fictional event must then also be 
fictional—and so we face the prospect of an endless series of implicit narra-
tors. This conception of narrative mediacy as literal (irrespective of whether 
 3. Note that extradiegetic narration is defined in relation to the most inclusive, or first-
level, diégèse, not in relation to the main action of the narrative. So Marlow relates the main 
action of Heart of Darkness, but his narration is intradiegetic, represented as taking place 
during a long night on the sea-reach of the Thames, waiting for the tide to turn. The point is 
that Genette’s taxonomy of narration is a structural one, rather than a rhetorical one.
 4. Richardson mentions a number of canonical modern texts for which it is unhelpful to 
take this literalistic view of the extradiegetic narrative situation (2001b: 700–1); many more 
examples could be added.
Figure 1.1. from Narrative Discourse 248 (simplified)
level:
relaTiOnShiP:
Extradiegetic Intradiegetic
Heterodiegetic homer Scheherazade
Homodiegetic marcel Ulysses
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or not the narrative is fictive) means that each act of narration, and the dié-
gèse to which it belongs, must be part of one continuous line of narrative 
transmission through which that narration is channeled. If narrative mediacy 
is always transmission, the communicative model of narrative levels allows 
for no point of ontological discontinuity.5
 The category of person, as re-articulated in Genette’s distinction between 
homodiegetic and heterodiegetic narration, also has a problematic relation to 
diégèse. In Narrative Discourse Revisited, Genette notes two circumstances in 
which the apparently heterodiegetic status of a narration can be compromised 
by a degree of “homodiegeticity” (1988: 80). The effect occurs in present-
tense narration and the narration of historical fiction. Present-tense narra-
tion, by foregrounding the narration’s contemporaneity to diegetic events, 
pulls towards a sense of the narratorial perspective as that of a witness, who 
would therefore be part of the diégèse (Genette cites the last chapter of Tom 
Jones among his examples). The narration of a historical novel, on the other 
hand, by virtue of its claims to historicity, undermines our sense of the narra-
tive’s discrete diegetic universe and consequently the narrator comes to figure 
as a quasi-homodiegetic “subsequent witness,” in Genette’s phrase (1988: 
80). As these examples make clear, in the communicative model diégèse is 
not conceived of merely as an effect of signification, but as an ontological 
notion; and the category of person comes down to a relation of identity or 
non-identity between the narrator and some member of the story universe, 
the complete set of states of affairs posited by the narrative. Accordingly, the 
category of person has no place except within the ontology of fiction: non-
fictional heterodiegetic narration becomes meaningless. That is to say, the 
distinction of narrative person depends upon ontological discontinuity (cp. 
Genette 1993: 54–84; Cohn 1999: 109–31).
 5. Genette, of course, does not believe that fictions are true. He offers his own account 
of the ontological break between author and narrator required by his model, in an essay on 
John Searle’s pretended speech act account of fiction (Genette 1993: 30–53). The thrust of 
his argument is that the authorial act of pretending to assert is also an indirect speech act 
instituting a fictional world, the world within which those same pretended assertions are the 
true assertions of a narrator. Genette’s appeal to indirect speech acts is a good move, I think 
(because it is a move towards a rhetorical model); his retention of Searle’s pretence account is 
not. The essential feature of Searle’s account is that a pretended assertion has no illocutionary 
force (that is what, for Searle, renders the falsehood of fictions unproblematic). The occasion 
for an indirect authorial speech act, therefore, does not even arise; no speech act at all, direct 
or indirect, is seriously performed. Yet Genette requires the pretence formula, as a basis for 
the structural role of extradiegetic narration. Accordingly the only serious speech act available, 
and the only candidate for the indirect institution of a fictional world, is the narrator’s—which 
is within the world in question. This is the same logical paradox as I have been describing, 
recast in a different form. See Walsh (2007: 74–78).
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 So, within the communicative model, the concept of level disallows onto-
logical discontinuity, because it is understood as a chain of literally trans-
mitted narratives; but the concept of person depends upon ontological 
discontinuity, because otherwise there can only be homodiegetic narration. 
The crunch comes when these contradictory implications of person and level 
meet in the extradiegetic heterodiegetic narrator. Genette’s example in Figure 
1.1 is Homer, which is rather evasive; elsewhere he also offers the narrator 
of Père Goriot. This narrator, he says, unlike Balzac himself, “knows” (with 
scare quotes) the events of the narrative as fact (1980: 214). If we take the 
claim literally, it aligns with the logic of narrative levels and the principle 
of ontological continuity, but contradicts the designation of this narrator as 
heterodiegetic. If we do not take it literally, Genette forfeits his rationale for 
distinguishing between this narrator and Balzac; and in terms of the com-
municative model such a heterodiegetic narrator would have to mediate the 
narration of a further narrator who does indeed know the events of the nar-
rative as fact—and so we founder upon an infinite regress of narrative levels. 
The collision between person and level, as I have articulated it here, follows 
from the communicative model’s ontological notion of diégèse as story world 
and its literal model of narrative transmission. And it should be clear that the 
problem of ontological discontinuity is simply the problem, in this model’s 
terms, of fictionality itself. The problem arises in the first place, then, because 
of the logical priority the communicative model grants to the products of fic-
tive representation.
 This is a mistake avoided by the most venerable alternative to the com-
municative account of person and level, Plato’s distinction between diegesis 
(the poet speaking in his own voice) and mimesis (the poet imitating the 
voice of a character). Such a distinction characterizes the act of fictive rep-
resentation, and taken as a typology of narration it identifies a single salient 
feature: the recursive possibility that a narration may represent another nar-
ration. It makes the cut, in other words, between Genette’s extradiegetic het-
erodiegetic category (diegesis) and all the others (mimesis). A typology of 
narration based upon Plato’s distinction, then, recognizes two hierarchical 
modes of fictive representation, which may be a matter of information (dieg-
esis) or of imitation (mimesis). In fictive diegesis, the information is offered 
and/or interpreted under the real-world communicative regime of fictionality, 
in which an awareness of its fictive orientation is integral to its rhetoric. In 
mimesis the imitation is specifically of an act of narration, so accordingly the 
informative function of diegesis is performed at one remove. The rhetorical 
gesture of fictionality, however, remains attached to the act of imitation itself. 
Note that this act is an imitation of a discursive form of narration, not of a 
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specific, notionally prior narrative act—it is a representational rather than 
reproductive use of the medium. The non-fictional version of this recursive 
structure would indeed be the transmission of an extant narrative; that is 
quotation, not mimesis. The two features of this model of fictive narration 
that I want to emphasize, then, are first that the fictive rhetorical gesture is 
always present, and always attached to the actual communicative act; and 
second that the recursive capacity of the model is subordinate to this fictive 
rhetoric, but also defined in terms of communicative acts. The permutations 
of this relation between fictionality and narrative information can accommo-
date the range of narratorial possibilities identified by Genette’s typology in 
Figure 1.1, whether the diegesis mediates a mimesis of non-fictive narration 
(Ulysses), or of fictive narration (Scheherazade); or whether the mimesis is 
coextensive with the narrative itself (Marcel).
 In order to draw out the implications of this view of fictive communica-
tion and its capacity for recursiveness, I shall invoke Marie-Laure Ryan’s 
interesting alternative to the narrative-level model of recursiveness, which is 
the concept (borrowed from computer science) of the stack. The metaphor, 
she explains, refers to a stack of trays in a cafeteria: “The stack is supported 
by a spring, and the top tray is always level with the counter. When a cus-
tomer puts a tray on the top of the stack, the structure must be pushed down 
in order to make the top tray even with the counter; when a tray is removed, 
the structure pops up, and the next tray on the stack is lifted to counter level. 
Being on top of the stack and level with the counter makes a tray the ‘current 
tray’” (1990: 878). She illustrates the idea with an example representing the 
tales within tales of the Arabian Nights, as in Figure 1.2. 
 These are snapshots of the stack at two different points in the narrative—
the “Tale of Ali Baba” and the “Young Man’s Tale.” The diagram is offered 
as a representation of distinct ontological realms within the narrative, but it 
Figure 1.2. from “Stacks, Frames and boundaries,” 880 
(simplified)
Ali Baba
Arabian Nights
Young  
Man’s Tale
Amina’s Tale
The Three  
Ladies of Baghdad
Arabian Nights
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works equally well as a representation of distinct narrative acts; and as a dia-
gram of recursive narration it is something we can work with. But first of all, 
as drawn it does not really capture the most suggestive feature of the stack 
metaphor as Ryan herself glosses it, which is the notion of the “current tray” 
at counter level. That would suggest the arrangement in Figure 1.3, in which 
anything below counter level is beneath our threshold of attention at a given 
point (I have added a snapshot of pure diegesis to clarify the idea).
 But now I want to revise the model, because although intermediate layers 
of narration may be occluded while we attend to the current narration, I have 
argued that the fictive rhetorical gesture of the diegesis is not. So we need to 
adjust the counter level, and represent the buoyancy of the stack as in Figure 
1.4.
 The actual communicative act here, The Arabian Nights, has a fictive ori-
entation that is necessarily apparent at all times, even when it is not the direct 
focus of our attention; whereas any narrative levels (or degrees of recursion) 
in between the diegesis and the current narration are virtually effaced. Not 
absolutely effaced, because it is open to us at any moment to wonder, for 
example, whether the current story is likely to interest King Shariah as much 
as Sheherazade needs it to (which refers us, even during the “Young Man’s 
Tale,” to the telling of “The Three Ladies of Baghdad”). So these levels are 
collapsed, latent contexts of the current narrative situation. This is as true of 
recursive narrative structures in which the intermediate levels of narration 
Figure 1.3. after ryan (first revision)
Figure 1.4. after ryan (second revision)
Young  
Man’s Tale
Arabian Nights
Arabian Nights
Ali Baba
Arabian Nights
Arabian Nights
Young  
Man’s Tale
Amina’s Tale
The Three  
Ladies of Baghdad
Arabian Nights
Ali Baba
Arabian Nights
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are all non-fictive with respect to each other. So, in Frankenstein, we attend 
to the monster’s narration in its own right, not as Walton’s written record of 
Victor’s oral relation of that narration. This is not at all to say that we do 
not cross-reference between the monster’s narration and information gleaned 
from our attention to these framing narrative acts when they are current; nor 
does it exclude our response to thematic connections between levels, which is 
provided for by our continual awareness of Mary Shelley’s fictive rhetoric.6
 The collapsed intermediate levels in this diagram are a mark of the insub-
stantiality of narrative transmission as conceived in the communicative model. 
One of the merits of the most prominent alternative to Genette’s typology of 
narration, Stanzel’s typological circle, is that it registers this insubstantiality 
(Figure 1.5).
 The category of figural narrative treats the perspectival mode Genette 
called internal focalization as integral to narrative mediacy, which implies 
a salutary disregard for the communicative model’s commitment to a literal 
mode of transmission. Internal focalization is inherently an imaginative align-
ment of the narration with a character perspective: its assimilation, under the 
heading of mediacy, within the same typology as diegesis (the authorial situ-
ation) and mimesis (the first-person situation) implies the equally imaginative 
status of the latter’s recursive structure. Both are contingent devices of the 
rhetoric of fictive narration, and neither entails a commitment to the literal 
logic of narrative transmission that leads the communicative model astray. 
On the other hand, the figural narrative situation cannot be homologous 
with Stanzel’s other two categories in the sense that they are with each other, 
precisely because the character perspective is not part of any communication. 
Unlike first-person narrative, figural narrative is not a recursive representa-
tional doubling of the narrative act that characterizes authorial narrative. 
The same blurring of conceptual boundaries occurs within a different para-
digm when Mieke Bal proposes to incorporate focalization into the recursive 
hierarchy of embedded narration. She notes that, as a criterion of recursive-
ness, “the two units must belong to the same class” (43), but then defines the 
relevant class, too broadly, as “subject-object relations” (45), which effaces 
the key difference between narration and focalization—that is, communica-
tion. So too with the figural narrative situation: its assimilation to the same 
class as diegesis and mimesis disregards the intrinsically communicative 
nature of narration. The figural narrative situation cannot be reconciled with 
communication, not even self-communication, since it definitionally involves 
 6. The concept of voice as idiom is also illuminated by this characteristic strategy, in the 
Gothic novel, of embedding multiple layers of narration—as we shall see below.
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a disjunction between narration and character perspective. Monika Fludernik 
aptly describes the figural narrative situation as “non-communicative nar-
rative” (1994: 445), which captures its incompatibility with the literal logic 
of the communicative model. But from a more inclusive rhetorical point of 
view, non-communicative narrative is a contradiction in terms; and it is only 
from a rhetorical point of view that any parity between (represented) narra-
tive transmission and character perception can be countenanced in the first 
place. Figural narration, from this perspective, is simply a rhetorical option 
available to diegesis; one that exploits fiction’s imaginative freedom from the 
literalism of the communicative model just as some features of first-person 
narration do, but without the recursive structure of mimesis.
 The categories of person and level, as conceived in the communicative 
model, are logically incompatible with each other, then, and we can only 
make sense of fictive narratives (and narratives within narratives) in terms of 
a rhetorical paradigm more akin to Plato’s distinction between diegesis and 
mimesis and the recursive options it accommodates. This rhetorical paradigm 
involves awareness of fictionality at all times as an integral part of our inter-
pretation of fictions, so that recursive narratives do not at any point harden 
into discrete ontological facts with logical implications beyond the rhetorical 
focus of the particular case. Fictionality is a rhetorical gesture: as rhetoric it 
is necessarily communicative; as a gesture it is semiotic, but not intrinsically 
linguistic. This is important for two reasons. Firstly it accounts for a problem 
that exercises Genette in his discussion of La Chute, which (because of its 
Figure 1.5. from A Theory of Narrative xvi (simplified)
First-person 
situation
Authorial
situation
Figural  
situation
Reflector-
character
Internal perspective 
(limited POV)
Identity  
of worlds
Teller-
character
External perspective 
(omniscience)
Non-identity  
of worlds
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resemblance to dramatic monologue) he is tempted to say has no extradi-
egetic level (1988: 89); as well as the analogous issue of the status of interior 
monologue, over which Stanzel and Dorrit Cohn disagree—Cohn sees it as 
direct discourse, Stanzel as pure reflector mode (Cohn 1981: 169–70). These 
problems arise because of an assumption that the fictive diegesis, to be dieg-
esis at all, must be a linguistic act—so that if there is no overt narration to the 
reader, there is no diegesis. But communication is the semiotic use of media: 
as long as the character discourse is understood as represented, not transmit-
ted, the fictive act of the diegesis is manifest. The second reason for insisting 
upon a semiotic frame of reference is already apparent from the way these 
two problem cases border upon drama: it is that a rhetorical model of fiction-
ality as a communicative gesture recognizes no categorical boundary between 
fictions in language and fictions in other media. So whereas the model of 
mediacy presented by Stanzel embodies a tradition in which mediacy is an 
indirect form of representation, and its antithesis is the direct, immediate pre-
sentation of drama, or film, I am claiming instead that mediacy is a property 
of media; and that the distinction between, for instance, fiction and drama 
is not a distinction between indirect and direct form, but between different 
semiotic means of representation: in one case symbolic (language), in the 
other iconic (mise en scène, performance, etc.).7
 There is an inherent possibility for any representational medium to repre-
sent an instance of its own use: for example, a film that represents the filming 
of a series of events (e.g. The Blair Witch Project, in which the whole film 
takes the form of documentary footage shot by the hapless characters; or The 
French Lieutenant’s Woman, in which a relationship between two actors par-
allels that of their characters in the film they are making). Such recursive pos-
sibilities are rarely realized in the extradiegetic instance of a film, though the 
film-within-a-film is common enough. By contrast, the equivalent in linguistic 
fiction encompasses the whole range and history of homodiegetic narration, 
as well as intradiegetic narration (whether homo- or hetero-); that is to say, 
the whole order of narrative mimesis in Plato’s sense. The reason, presum-
ably, is that verbal narration is a native human faculty, whereas cinematic 
narration is a sophisticated technological extension of human narrative pow-
ers. On the other hand, the private, internal faculty of narrative articulation 
(that is, self-communication) may as readily be cognitively perceptual as lin-
 7. Note that the language within dramatic performance is itself represented, and sub-
ordinate to the iconic function of the medium. My position here takes up the possibility of a 
trans-media model of narrative raised by Manfred Jahn (2001: 675–76) and Brian Richardson 
(2001a: 691), though emphatically not by postulating the agency of a dramatic (or filmic) nar-
rator, for the reasons I first set out in “Who Is the Narrator?” (1997).
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guistic—as, for example, in dreams or memories. Techniques of literary nar-
ration that strive to represent this mental faculty (interior monologue, stream 
of consciousness) can be seen as straining at the limits of their medium, and 
depend upon the establishment of certain representational conventions; their 
filmic equivalents—representations of dream narratives, for example—are 
accommodated more straightforwardly by the medium (it is notable that 
dreams figure prominently in the early history of film).8 The prominence, in 
verbal fictions, of the mimetic paradigm (that is, of the narrating instance 
as a product of representation) may account for a non sequitur that seems 
to underlie the communicative model. Represented narrations are theorized 
(modeled) in terms of actual narrations—a perfectly appropriate interpre-
tative strategy (though theory often extends it well beyond its legitimately 
rhetorical scope by insisting upon a systematic logical equivalence that is by 
no means inherent in the analogy, and sometimes obfuscatory); then, by a 
kind of back-formation, actual narrations of fiction are themselves modeled 
as represented narrations—a move that requires some such hypothesis as a 
default narrator and a dummy representational frame. A trans-media sense 
of narrating instance can be a helpful corrective here if we reflect upon the 
redundancy of treating film in that way; as if there were any theoretical divi-
dend to be gained from regarding the discourse of every fiction film not as the 
film itself, but as something ontologically framed and mediated by the film 
(the discourse of a filmic narrator, communicating as fact the narrative of the 
film, through the medium of film, yet being only a formal inference from the 
fictionality of the film).9
 By viewing the narrating instance as a representational act, then, I am 
affirming two things. Firstly, that the most elementary and irreducible dis-
tinction among narrating instances is not symmetrical but hierarchical, cor-
responding to Plato’s distinction between diegesis and mimesis as, on the one 
 8. Richardson’s discussion of memory plays (2001a: 682–83) provides further support 
for this observation.
 9. This is essentially David Bordwell’s point in Narration in the Fiction Film (1985), 
where he argues for a view of filmic narration as the set of cues from which the viewer con-
structs the fabula, but denies that narration implies a narrator (1985: 62). His emphasis upon 
the viewer’s understanding of the representational product inevitably slights the communicative 
process, however, and arises from problems with the notion of fictionality that Bordwell does 
not explore, despite the prominence of “fiction” in his title. Edward Branigan does discuss 
communication in the context of fictionality, though preferring to “remain neutral” (1992: 
107) on the merits of communication models. He finds himself caught between, on the one 
hand, a sense of agency in narration—he himself speaks of “an implicit extra-fictional narra-
tion [ . . . ] the ‘voice’ of an ‘implied author’” (91)—and, on the other hand, the “anthropo-
morphic fiction” of a narrator (108–10). On this question, see also Jan Alber’s contribution in 
this volume.
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hand, a first-degree act of narrative representation (Genette’s extra-hetero-
diegetic narration), and on the other hand, a second-degree narrative repre-
sentation of a narrative representation (extra-homodiegetic narration, and 
all intradiegetic narration, homo- or hetero-). Second-degree narrative rep-
resentation is more prevalent in linguistic media than others, but in any case 
encompasses all circumstances in which the need arises for a second sense of 
voice, as represented idiom, in conjunction with the sense of voice as narrat-
ing instance, because such narrative mimesis encompasses all circumstances 
in which the instance is itself an object of representation. Secondly, I am 
affirming the importance of a distinction between narrative representation 
and narrative transmission. Properly speaking, media cease to function trans-
missively (i.e. as technological conduits for independently semiotic content) 
as soon as they themselves become semiotic—which is to say, here, represen-
tational. So it is possible in non-fiction for a narrating instance to be trans-
mitted within a framing instance (for example when a historian quotes an 
eye-witness account, or when a literary biography quotes from the work of its 
subject), but within fiction the appearance of such hierarchies of transmission 
is itself a product of representational rhetoric. The various transgressions of 
level that Genette classifies as metalepsis, whether foregrounded or inciden-
tal, are answerable only to that rhetoric: their significance is to be evaluated 
in relation to the discernible import of the representational discourse, rather 
than to the iron law of non-contradiction. Apart from the pragmatic, con-
textual circumstances of actual communication (including actual fictive com-
munication), the structure of narrative instanciation does not exist except as 
a product of representation, and the logic of represented narrative transmis-
sion has no priority over the rhetorical emphases of the representational act 
itself. Narrative theory and interpretation, then, must avoid the temptation 
to impose the coherence of a systematic logical structure upon the process 
of narrative representation, which is contingent and inherently protean in its 
rhetorical emphasis and focus, direction and misdirection. In reading through 
the represented structure of narrative transmission, narratologists should take 
care not to mistake interpretative strategies for theoretical paradigms.
 Where voice is used as a metaphor of idiom in narrative theory, it is a way 
of bringing to the fore the mimetic dimension of the narrative discourse; its 
capacity for representing the discourse of another. The represented discourse 
concerned may itself be a narrating instance, or it may be a discursive act 
of another kind; it may imply a particular discursive subject, or it may be 
a generic representation. The defining feature of voice in the sense of idiom 
is that it is always objectified, as the product of a representational rhetoric; 
and in this respect it is crucial to keep it distinct from voice as instance. The 
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temptation is to apply the sense of voice as idiom equally to represented dis-
courses and first-degree narrative discourse, or diegesis, because intuitively, 
narrative language does not only represent voices, but also exhibits voice. 
In rhetorical terms, however, the function of voice in these two discursive 
contexts—diegesis and mimesis—is quite different. It is true that we are likely 
to focus upon a similar range of phenomena whether we attend to qualities 
of voice in narrative diegesis or in a represented discourse; but the signifi-
cance of these phenomena for narrative interpretation is radically distinct in 
each case. When attending to voice in diegesis we are attending to rhetorical 
means (which may or may not be intentional, but are certainly authorial); 
whereas in attending to voice in represented discourses we are attending to 
rhetorical effects—even where these take the form of represented rhetorical 
means, as for example in the case of a represented narrating instance (Hum-
bert Humbert’s, say). So in diegesis, questions of voice bear upon the sig-
nificance we attribute to the represented events, the narrative object; whereas 
mimetic voice (which I am calling idiom) invites evaluation of the character 
whose discourse it represents—the discursive or narrative subject. It is easy to 
see why the notion of voice as idiom might seem applicable to all discourse, 
but it is also apparent, I think, that such usage strains the range of a single 
concept, given this disparity of rhetorical emphasis. In fact, the case in which 
both senses of voice are applicable (that of a represented narrating instance) 
does not obscure the difference between them, but highlights it. A narrative 
told by a character, considered as idiom, contributes to the job of charac-
terization; considered as instance, it contributes to the job of narration. In 
Moby-Dick, Ishmael’s narration considered as idiom tells us about Ishmael; 
as instance it tells us about Ahab and the white whale. Most of the time there 
is no incompatibility between these two functions, though the emphasis var-
ies widely from case to case; but fictions can include embedded narratives for 
reasons that have nothing to do with characterization, and in fact the latter 
may be an undesirable distraction. In such cases idiom defers to instance: this 
is commonplace in film, where a character’s narration typically progresses in 
quick succession from diegetic verbal discourse to voice-over, to impersonal 
filmic narration (Citizen Kane, for example, provides several variations on 
this technique); but consider also the gothic novel, where the function of 
elaborate narrative embedding often has much less to do with the narrat-
ing characters than with a generic strategy for bridging the gap between the 
reader’s quotidian norms and the novel’s extreme, imaginatively remote sub-
ject matter (a similar strategy, in fact, to the “friend of a friend” framework 
typical of urban legend). Perhaps the most extreme example is Melmoth the 
Wanderer, the story of which is in part relayed via a Shropshire clergyman, 
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Melmoth the Wanderer himself, the ancient Jew Adonijah and the Spaniard 
Monçada to the student John Melmoth. Furthermore, these various narrating 
instances span about 150 years; yet there is little attempt to distinguish the 
idiom of any of them.
 Even within narratives in linguistic media, voice is used in senses ranging 
from the almost literal, for representations of oral discourse, to metaphorical 
applications so far abstracted from orality that the term becomes virtually 
interchangeable with vision: but throughout this spectrum the notion of voice 
enshrines an assumption that the distinctive features of a discourse afford 
an insight into an enunciating subject—that voice is expression. Indeed this 
assumption provides the whole rhetorical basis for the representational evo-
cation of voice that I am categorizing as idiom: the point of representing a 
character’s idiom is very much to invite inference about that character’s sub-
jectivity. Inference of this kind, however, is a much more hazardous and less 
obviously relevant undertaking when the notional voice is not objectified, as 
in narrative diegesis. In this case, many of the discursive features commonly 
embraced by voice are equally, and perhaps better, understood as style: by 
style I mean discourse features understood in their relation to meaning, as 
conceived within the field of stylistics, rather than as the expression of sub-
jectivity. This substitution makes it easier to recognize that there is no inher-
ent expression of authorial subjecthood—no authentic self-presence—in such 
discursive features; nor indeed is there inherently a singular authorial subject, 
either in linguistic media or (more self-evidently) in non-linguistic media. Of 
course stylistic analysis also relates discourse to ideological import, and this 
intimates another sense of voice that remains usefully applicable to narrative 
diegesis, but which relates narrative rhetoric to the constitution of a subject 
position, rather than to an originary subject as such. I shall return to this dis-
tinction later.
 For all forms of represented discourse, then, voice as idiom is a particular 
(idiosyncratic or typical) discursive evocation of character. It is worth insist-
ing upon the correspondence between such rhetorical strategies in different 
media, in order to grasp the phenomenon at a representational level rather 
than a specifically linguistic level. The recursive model of represented voice 
that I have invoked suggests that the place to look for analogies would not 
be representations of verbal discourse in non-verbal media, but rather those 
cases where a medium is used to represent an instance of its own use. I have 
already suggested that the range of represented narrating instances in film 
might be taken to extend from fairly literal representations of the use of filmic 
apparatus to representations of the use of the medium’s semiotic channels, as 
mimetic of cognitive narrative processes. On this basis represented narrating 
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instances, which occupy one part of the territory covered by the concept of 
voice as idiom, would include dream or fantasy sequences, as in the films of 
Billy Liar and The Secret Life of Walter Mitty, both of which include filmic 
representation of their protagonists’ day-dreams; but the same principle can 
be extended to other represented discursive and cognitive acts, including any 
point-of-view shot that represents the character’s own distinct cognitive-per-
ceptual subjectivity. A good example would be the recurrent shot, in Once 
upon a Time in the West, of a blurred figure approaching, which turns out 
to represent the memory of “Harmonica” (Charles Bronson): it is the per-
spective of his exhausted younger self (he has been struggling to support the 
weight of his brother, who has a noose around his neck) as Frank (Henry 
Fonda) approaches to torment him further by pushing a harmonica into his 
mouth as he is on the point of collapse.
 The most inclusive applications of the term voice in narrative—those that 
are interchangeable with terms like vision—suggest the equal applicability of 
linguistic and perceptual metaphors for the concept, which is a helpful sup-
port for the proposal that the issue of voice should be placed in the context of 
representational rhetoric across all narrative media. The analogy with vision 
also relates directly to another prominent metaphor in narrative theory, 
which is focalization.10 But there is a crucial distinction between focalization 
and the discursive features that fall under idiom. Voice as idiom always con-
structs a distinct subject (even if generic), by virtue of its objectification—that 
is, its difference from the narrative diegesis (or a framing narrative mimesis) 
within which it is represented. Focalization, on the other hand, constructs a 
subject position only, which may or may not be aligned with a represented 
character (external focalization is precisely not character centred). When 
focalization is aligned with a character, its rhetorical means may very well 
be a representation of idiom. Consider the relation between free indirect dis-
course (FID) and internal focalization. FID is one of the privileged topics in 
discussions of narrative voice, and as represented discourse it falls within the 
scope of voice as idiom. It also necessarily implies internal focalization (how-
ever momentary), though the reverse is not true: internal focalization does 
not always involve FID, or any other representation of idiom. FID is a form of 
discursive mimesis, whereas focalization is a feature of narrative diegesis (not, 
I hasten to add, of narrative transmission: it is a product of representational 
rhetoric, not an information conduit). Where FID and internal focalization 
 10. Fludernik, discussing the relation between voice and focalization, argues for the theo-
retical redundancy of the latter (2001: 633–35). I find it helpful to retain it, however, as an 
aid to discriminating between the different senses of voice, which are often in play at the same 
time.
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coincide, these are two sides of the same coin: the one oriented towards the 
represented discourse, the other towards the subject position constructed by 
that representation. The sense in which FID involves some kind of doubling 
of voice was encapsulated in the title of Roy Pascal’s classic study, The Dual 
Voice, as well as in Mikhail Bakhtin’s concept of double-voiced discourse, of 
which it is a very specific instance (I shall return to Bakhtin below). FID is a 
representation of the idiom—the objectified voice—of another, in neutral or 
parodic style, with sympathetic or ironic inflection, but in any case with a 
certain distance inherent in the fact that the representing act itself remains in 
the fore. The indices of the representational act persist within the representa-
tion itself in the form of temporal and perspectival markers (past-tense verbs, 
third-person pronouns) that correlate with the subject position implied by the 
narrating instance rather than that implied by the idiomatic voice. That is to 
say, the narrating voice inhabits FID not as idiom, but as instance (overtly; it 
also involves interpellation, as we shall see): FID is double-voiced only in the 
sense that it is a synthetic product of distinct senses of voice.11
 Whilst certain forms of focalization go hand in hand with representa-
tions of voice as idiom, such as FID, this is not the sense in which voice may 
be understood as applicable to focalization in general. As idiom, voice is an 
object of representation: it is offered up to the evaluative scrutiny of the nar-
rative’s audience, and so held at arm’s length. There is a structurally intrin-
sic detachment, however sympathetic, to the rhetorical function of voice as 
idiom. Focalization in general, however, does not operate in this way: the 
perspectival logic of a representation is not manifested as an object, but as 
an implicit premise of the rhetorical focus of the representational act. That 
is to say, while voice as idiom serves to characterize a discursive subject as a 
more or less individuated object of representation, focalization as such func-
tions indirectly, to establish a subject position only; one that may or may 
not coincide with a specific character, but which in any case is not an object 
of representation but a tacit rhetorical effect of the discourse’s mode of rep-
resentation of another object. Where a specific character is involved, it is 
possible to describe represented idiom as an effect of sympathetic or ironic 
detachment, and focalization as an effect of empathetic subjective alignment 
(as long as the term empathy can be understood as without evaluative preju-
 11. The possibility of analogies for FID in other media raises interesting questions: con-
sider the way Hitchcock represents the experience of vertigo in the film of that name, in the 
famous tower shot combining a zoom out and track in to maintain a constant image size, or 
frame range, in a view down a (model) stairwell. The device is mimetic of James Stewart’s 
struggle to make sense of his perceptions, but as an overtly filmic technique—a simultaneous 
track and zoom—it is also part of the representational rhetoric of the diegetic narrative itself.
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dice). The more general, abstract concept that applies to the latter effect, 
however, is interpellation. This is the term I am using to define the third sense 
in which voice is used in narrative theory and criticism.
 Interpellation is the process by which an ideology or discourse “hails” and 
constitutes individuals as subjects (Althusser 1971: 162). Narration always 
involves perspectival choices, which necessarily carry with them some set of 
presuppositions, ranging from the physical (spatio-temporal), through the 
epistemological, to the ideological. This structure of presupposition may be 
aligned with a character, as in first-person narration and internal focalization, 
or it may not; but in every case the act of narrative comprehension requires 
an imaginative alignment between the reader (or viewer) and the implied sub-
ject position of the discourse. Such alignment may, to an extent, be conscious 
and qualified by reservations of several kinds; but to the extent that it is 
unconscious, it has the ideological effect of making the implied subject posi-
tion seem to constitute the authentic selfhood of the narrative recipient.12
 I have discussed the sense in which voice, as represented idiom, can be 
understood as a rhetorical means of characterizing the subject of represented 
discourse. It is a perfectly intelligible and modest figurative leap from there to 
a usage of voice that refers to the subject position implied by any discourse 
(represented or diegetic, aligned with a character or not). This is a distinct 
sense of voice not only because it need not be representationally embodied 
or owned by a character, or a narrating character, or indeed the author, but 
also because its scope extends well beyond the category of the discursive, or 
even the perspectival in any limited perceptual or cognitive sense (the domain 
of focalization), to become an organizing concept for ideology. Where the 
concept of voice is invoked in this sense, it seems to do quite various services 
for critical orientations ranging from Bakhtinian dialogics to identity politics. 
The figurative instability of the term itself is partly responsible, no doubt: it 
allows for uncertain fluctuation between a usage in which the ideological sub-
ject position is a discursive construct, and a usage in which it is an authentic 
manifestation of (subaltern) identity.13
 In Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, Bakhtin identifies a range of double-
voiced phenomena in narrative discourse, the dialogic nature of which is 
only brought out by a theoretical approach he describes as “metalinguistic” 
 12. The mechanism of presupposition underlying the interpellation of subjects has been 
explored by John Frow in relation to genre and Vološinov’s concept of the literary enthymeme, 
or argument with an implied premise (Frow 1986: 77–78).
 13. Susan Lanser’s Fictions of Authority (1992) is a useful example of the politicization of 
voice from a feminist perspective. Lanser makes a clear distinction between voice in the sense 
I am calling idiom and a sense that equates with instance/interpellation, though she does not 
discriminate between the latter two senses.
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(181). This is because double-voiced discourse is only perceptible as a feature 
of concrete, situated language use, from which the discipline of linguistics 
(including formal stylistics) is necessarily abstracted. Double-voiced discourse 
emerges, then, when the manifest voice of an utterance can be contextually 
understood to be in dialogue with some other, implicit voice. Voice in this 
second sense cannot be assimilated to voice as idiom, since it is not rep-
resented; or to voice as instance, since it is not even explicit.14 Its implicit 
nature, and the fact that it is not necessarily attributable to a particular sub-
ject, or even any specific discursive form, marks this out as a sense of voice 
that falls within the scope of interpellation. But clearly, since the dialogic 
interaction that interests Bakhtin is ideological (ideology being the unify-
ing principle of the voice with which the discourse is engaged), the sense of 
voice that applies on the explicit side of the dialogue also finds its integrity 
in ideological terms, rather than as a set of formal discourse features, or the 
represented idiom of a particular subject. So Bakhtin describes Dostoevsky’s 
Notes from Underground as double voiced in that the Underground Man’s 
discourse throughout is not only oriented towards its objects, but also in 
dialogue with the anticipated response of another: “In each of his thoughts 
about [the world, nature, society] there is a battle of voices, evaluations, 
points of view. In everything he senses above all someone else’s will predeter-
mining him” (236). The ideological thrust of his own discourse is precisely 
to establish the autonomy and integrity of the subject position he claims for 
himself, yet the attempt itself involves him in an unresolvable dialogic vicious 
circle: “What he fears most of all is that . . . his self-affirmation is somehow in 
need of affirmation or recognition by another. And it is in this direction that 
he anticipates the other’s response. . . . He fears that the other might think 
he fears that other’s opinion. . . . With his refutation, he confirms precisely 
what he wishes to refute, and he knows it” (229). In other words, the Under-
ground Man’s discourse projects a subject position that is nevertheless unoc-
cupiable. In general, Bakhtin’s concept of polyphony necessarily dissociates 
voice from the individual subject; but without some other organizing prin-
ciple the polyphony would be too diffuse a phenomenon to be conceptually 
useful—and in fact the notion of monologism, which Bakhtin retains, would 
be unintelligible. The organizing principle at work in Bakhtin’s system is a 
concept of voice as the relative agglomeration of ideological significance, the 
 14. The need to discriminate between senses of voice is apparent in the conclusion to 
which Richard Aczel is led by a consideration of this specific Bakhtinian context: “Narrative 
voice, like any other voice, is a fundamentally composite entity, a specific configuration of 
voices” (1998: 483). If every voice is a configuration of voices, the term is being made to work 
too hard.
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integrity of which is not (even in the most monological instance) to be found 
in the discursive subject as such, but in the projection of virtual subject posi-
tions: that is, in the mechanism of interpellation. By distinguishing between 
voice as instance and as interpellation, I am contrasting a sense of the term in 
which it represents the narrating agency of a particular individual or collec-
tive, with one in which it discursively insinuates an ideological nexus, a sub-
ject position with the potential to constitute a particular subject (represented 
or otherwise). Such a distinction, I think, provides for a politicized sense of 
voice in which the contextual production of situated political identities is at 
stake (to be engaged critically, recognized or resisted), without hypostasizing 
the concept as the authentic expression of such identities.
 If my discrimination between the different senses of voice has any merit, 
it is the result of approaching the issue with two key assumptions in mind. 
First, an assumption that the senses of voice—instance, idiom and interpel-
lation—need to be conceived in terms of representational rhetoric, and in 
particular the rhetoric of fictionality; and second, an assumption that the 
issues covered by the term voice are not exclusively linguistic, but also semi-
otic, and relevant across the whole range of narrative media. It seems to me 
that these premises are crucial, not only to expose the inadequacies of the 
communicative model of narration, but also to take us beyond it. I have 
insisted upon the metaphoricity of the notion of voice as the precondition 
for its range of application both within and beyond linguistic media, and the 
terms I have used to discriminate between senses of voice can only cover that 
range themselves by virtue of a certain amount of extension and extrapola-
tion. So, I have used the term instance to refer to the sense of voice as an act 
of narrative representation, which is to say the sense in which the empha-
sis falls upon communicative agency in narration. I have suggested that the 
most fundamental distinction to be drawn within this category arises out of 
the inherent possibility of recursiveness in narration, whereby one narrating 
instance may represent another. I have shown how this distinction, which 
corresponds to the Platonic distinction between diegesis and mimesis, cuts 
across the fourfold typology of narrating instances Genette derives from his 
oppositions between homodiegetic and heterodiegetic, and intradiegetic and 
extradiegetic narration, and I have argued further for a rhetorical perspective 
upon narration that does not confuse representation with transmission. My 
use of the term idiom serves to group together senses of voice in which the 
emphasis falls upon the discursive subject as an object of representation—
that is, where voice serves purposes of characterization. This definition pro-
vides for analogies between literary representations of voice and examples 
of mimetic recursiveness in other media. It has also allowed me to make a 
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principled distinction between represented voice and focalization (the latter 
being a form of my third category of voice, interpellation), and to distin-
guish the different senses of voice that apply in the notably complex case of 
free indirect discourse. Finally, I have used the term interpellation to refer to 
those respects in which voice relates to a representational subject position 
rather than to a represented or actual subject as such. Focalization, I have 
suggested, is a special, restricted case of voice in this sense, in which the 
subject position is defined in perceptual and cognitive terms. In the general 
case, the sense of voice as interpellation embraces more abstract, ideological 
constructions of a subject position, and I have shown how such a concep-
tion of voice can account for its use in the context of Bakhtinian dialogics. If 
nothing else, this analysis of the metaphor of voice in narrative theory shows 
that it has already gone a long way beyond words, and indeed that it is per-
haps too richly suggestive for its own good. There is little to be gained from 
attempting to constrain the use of such a metaphor, but it is worth insisting 
upon the need for more nuanced distinctions; the terms I have suggested 
here—instance, idiom, and interpellation—offer one way of doing just that.
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